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Abstract
The aim of this study is the risk analysis evaluation about argon release from the 
GERDA experiment in the Gran Sasso underground National Laboratories (LNGS) of 
the Italian National Institute for Nuclear Physics (INFN).
The GERDA apparatus, located in Hall A of the LNGS, is a facility with germa-
nium detectors located in a wide tank filled with about 70 m3 of cold liquefied argon. 
This cryo-tank sits in another water-filled tank (700 m3) at atmospheric pressure. 
In such cryogenic processes, the main cause of an accidental scenario is lacking 
insulation of the cryo-tank.
A preliminary HazOp analysis has been carried out on the whole system. The 
risk assessment identified two possible top-events: explosion due to a Rapid Phase 
Transition - RPT and argon runaway evaporation.
Risk analysis highlighted a higher probability of occurrence of the latter top 
event. To avoid emission in Hall A, the HazOp, Fault Tree and Event tree analyses of 
the cryogenic gas extraction and ventilation plant have been made. The failures related 
to the ventilation system are the main cause responsible for the occurrence. To improve 
the system reliability some corrective actions were proposed: the use of UPS and the 
upgrade of damper opening devices. Furthermore, the Human Reliability Analysis 
identified some operating and management improvements: action procedure optimiza-
tion, alert warnings and  staff training.
The proposed model integrates the existing analysis techniques by applying the 
results to an atypical work environment and there are useful suggestions for improving 
the system reliability.
Keywords: argon release, cryogenic fluid, HazOp, human reliability analysis, qualita-
tive and quantitative risk analysis.
Mara Lombardi
PhD, Researcher
Universita degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza-Engineering
Roma – Italy
mara.lombardi@uniroma1.it
Fabio Garzia
PhD, professor
Security Systems Universita degli Studi di Roma La 
Sapienza  - Engineering
Roma – Italy
fabio.garzia@uniroma1.it
Massimo Guarascio
PhD, professor
Safety and Risk Analysis Universita degli Studi di Roma 
La Sapienza  - Engineering
Roma – Italy
massimo.guarascio@uniroma1.it
Enzo Paolo Giovannone
Safety engineer CNVVF-Corpo Nazionale Vigili del Fuoco
L'Aquila – Italy
enzo.giovannone@vigilfuoco.it
Antonio Giampaoli
Safety engineer
Istituto Nazionale - Laboratori del Gran Sasso
L'Aquila – Abruzzo – Italy
antonio.giampaoli@lngs.infn.it
Mafalda Musti
Safety engineer
Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare,
Laboratori del gran Sasso
L'Aquila – Abruzzo – Italy
mafalda.musti@lngs.infn.it
Maria Teresa Ranalli
Safety engineer
Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare  - Laboratori del 
Gran Sasso
L'Aquila – Abruzzo – Italy
mariateresa.ranalli@lngs.infn.it
Risk analysis and reliability of the 
GERDA Experiment extraction and 
ventilation plant at Gran Sasso mountain 
underground laboratory of Italian 
National Institute for Nuclear Physicshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0370-44672016700141
308
Risk analysis and reliability of the GERDA Experiment extraction and ventilation plant at Gran Sasso mountain underground laboratory of Italian National Institute for Nuclear Physics
REM, Int. Eng. J., Ouro Preto, 70(3), 307-315, jul. sep. | 2017
Roberto Perruzza
Safety engineer of  Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare  - 
laboratori del Gran Sasso
L'Aquila – Abruzzo – Italy
roberto.perruzza@lngs.infn.it
Roberto Tartaglia
Safety engineer of Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare  - 
Laboratori del Gran sasso
L'Aquila – Abruzzo – Italy
roberto.tartaglia@lngs.infn.it
1. Introduction
According to many authors, to im-
prove safety one has to know where the 
risks are (Pasman et al., 2009). This is 
certainly true when it is necessary to de-
sign the safety of complex systems, where 
the predictive analysis of failure modes 
requires identification of the hazardous 
conditions, to quantify their probability of 
occurrence and to define representative ac-
cident scenarios. The representativeness of 
these scenarios is subject to the knowledge 
of production processes and system parts 
and the quantitative risk analysis requires 
that all failure events be considered (Zhao 
et al., 2016).
The proposed methodologies have 
been separated into three different phases: 
identification, evaluation and hierarchiza-
tion (Tixier et al., 2002).
From the accidental risk analysis, 
during the identification phase, a pressure 
rise in the cryostat over the design value 
(a) and exceeding of the containment and 
insulation conditions (b) of the cryogenic 
liquid was identified and it was possible 
to identify a dominating critical scenario 
due to a mixing of the shielding water of 
the Water Tank with the cryogenic liquid 
(LAr), which leads to an explosive effect 
due to Rapid Phase Transition (RTP). This 
mode can be considered as a critical sub 
system of containment loss (mixture of 
LAr and Water)
A second scenario is a relevant rise 
of cryogenic liquid evaporation higher 
than the functional values.  There is a risk 
of hypo-oxygenation and hypothermia, 
depending on the modalities with which 
the release itself is managed. This scenario 
has a draining flow limit as the critical 
sub system.
Based on the Safety Management 
System procedures currently in use at 
the Laboratories, the risk analysis for all 
the apparatus is a step-by-step complex 
procedure that must be completed and 
agreed upon before the installation of the 
experiment.
According to the known whole 
documentation, the proposed analysis 
has been focused on the critical factors 
(evaluation phase) related both to the 
cryogenic liquid evaporation and to the 
functionality of the extraction/ventilation 
system, in order to identify, as hierarchiza-
tion phase, possible failure causes of the 
system and evaluate the device reliability 
of the system.
The "core" of the research consists 
of the application of industrial risk as-
sessment techniques and methodology 
in a high technology context and in a 
"prototype scale", as each experiment 
is really unique in the world. More-
over, the attention to the safety issues 
has to take into account the boundary 
condition of the underground labs, the 
confined area and the proximity to a 
public motorway tunnel.
2. Material and method
2.1 Gran Sasso National Laboratory (INFN)
INFN Gran Sasso National Labora-
tory (LNGS) is the largest underground 
laboratory in the world devoted to neu-
trino and astro-particle physics and it 
offers the most advanced underground 
infrastructures in terms of dimensions, 
complexity and completeness.
LNGS is funded by the National 
Institute for Nuclear Physics (INFN), the 
Italian Institution which coordinates and 
supports research in the field of elementary 
particles, nuclear and sub nuclear physics.
The laboratory is on one side of 
the 10-km long highway tunnel which 
crosses the Gran Sasso massif. It consists 
of three huge experimental halls (Hall 
A, Hall B and Hall C, each 100-m long, 
20-m wide and 18-m high) and the con-
nection among the halls is achieved by 
other smaller galleries: car tunnel, truck 
tunnel, connecting tunnels.
Halls are equipped with all technical 
and safety equipment and plants neces-
sary for the experimental activities and 
to ensure proper working conditions for 
underground users.
The 1400 m rock layer above the 
Laboratory represents a natural coverage 
that provides a cosmic ray flux reduction 
by one million times; moreover, the flux 
of neutrons in the underground halls is 
about a thousand times less than on the 
surface, due to the very small amount of 
uranium and thorium of the calcareous 
rock of the mountain.
The permeability of cosmic ra-
diation provided by the rock coverage 
together with the huge dimensions and 
the impressive basic infrastructure, make 
the Laboratory unmatched in the detec-
tion of weak or rare signals, which are 
relevant for astro-particle, sub nuclear 
and nuclear physics.
The research areas are:
- study of rare nuclear phenomena;
- study of the most penetrating com-
ponents of cosmic rays;
- neutrino physics;
- dark matter.
LNGS is subject to the European 
Directive Seveso III (2012/18/UE): the 
underground labs are classified as major 
accident hazard plants due to the presence 
of experiments using and storing remark-
able amounts of substances classified as 
dangerous for the environment. Accord-
ing to Seveso III, LNGS have adopted a 
Safety Management System (SGS), and 
before starting any activity or new project/
experiment, LNGS and Experimental 
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Collaborations must realize a Safety Risk 
Analysis in order to evaluate the probabil-
ity of occurrence of possible events and to 
guarantee the highest safety standards in a 
complex system such as the one in which 
LNGS are involved.
2.2 The GERDA Experiment
2.3 The GERDA experiment cryogenic gas extraction
The GERDA experiment has been 
proposed in 2004 as a new 76Ge double-
beta decay experiment at LNGS. The 
GERDA installation is a facility with ger-
manium detectors made out of isotopically 
enriched material. The detectors are oper-
ated inside a liquid argon shield: GERDA 
experiment has been designed for the clean 
handling and the stable long-term opera-
tion of the Germanium Detector Array 
in a shield of liquefied gas, copper and 
water that suppresses the environmental 
radioactivity by a factor of ~1/108.
The Ge detectors are lowered from 
the lock in the clean room into the 
center of a double-walled vacuum iso-
lated cryostat (Ø 4.2m, H=9m), which is 
filled with 6.5*104 liters of liquid argon 
(T = -175 ºC). The cryostat (see Figure 1) 
is manufactured from 30 tons of selected 
stainless steel of low radioactivity; its 
vertical walls are covered with 16 tons of 
ultrapure copper. The cryostat adheres to 
the principle of "leak before break", has 
no penetration below the fill level and is 
certified for 1.5 bar overpressure being 
actually operated at 1.2 bar.
The shield is completed by a tank 
(Ø=10m, H=9m) filled with ultrapure 
water; the water level rests at 8.4 m. 
It contains 580 m3 of purified water. 
It suppresses not only the external 
gamma radiation but also moderates 
and absorbs neutrons very efficiently. 
The water serves also as a radiator 
for a Cherenkov detector which al-
lows to identify and veto the few 
muons, ~60 per hour, which penetrate 
through the Gran Sasso massif into the 
GERDA setup.
The water tank can be completely 
drained within less than 2 hours.
The water tank has been built 
around the cryostat from top to bottom: 
roof and topmost cylindrical ring have 
been built first and have then been lifted 
by the hall crane for the assembly of the 
next ring underneath.
All vertical surfaces within the 
water tank including those of the cryo-
stat have been covered with a reflec-
tive and wave-length shifting foil for 
improved detection of the Cherenkov 
light. The purple layer on the cryostat’s 
wall consists of 6 mm thick extruded 
poly-styrene foam serving as a thermal 
impedance which limits the evaporation 
in case of a leak in the inner container. 
A similar barrier is mounted on the 
inner wall.
The final section of the own 
GERDA extraction and ventilation 
system is connected to the main 
general exhaust of the Underground 
Laboratories, that refers to two pump-
ing air stations: the Assergi (AQ) sta-
tion and the Casale San Nicola (TE) 
station. The Underground Labora-
tories ventilation system ensures the 
ejection of smoke and gases out of 
the laboratories up to a flow rate of 
≈6*104 m3/h.
Figure 1
labeled view of the GERDA installation.
The LNGS ejection system of cryo-
genic gases for GERDA is designed to 
ensure a maximum flow rate of 104 m3/h: 
the ejection point is close to the clean 
room at 7.30 meters high, into which all 
the cryogenic gases are directed and where 
the heat exchanger is installed. The under-
ground laboratories ventilation system is 
managed by a "slow-control software".
Two motorized dampers are in-
stalled close to the connection between 
the ejection system and the underground 
laboratories ventilation system; further-
more, another  damper is installed on the 
new ejection system to provide air ejection 
from the heat exchanger release point.
The system is equipped with AISI 
304 tubes with thickness in compliance 
with regulations, and is structured 
with a support and anchoring system, 
manual air dampers and extraction 
grills, motorized air dampers, control 
and detection devices.
The GERDA extraction system has 
to guarantee a constant ejection with a 
2.5*103 m3/h flow rate, up to 103 m3/h in 
case of "sudden" cryogenic gas release.
3. Results and discussion
3.1 Hazard identification
The main cause of an accidental 
scenario is the lack of insulation of the 
cryo-tank.
A preliminary HazOp analysis has 
been carried out on the whole system and 
in particular, the risk assessment identified 
two top-events more critical:
- TOP EVENT 1: explosion due to 
a Rapid Phase Transition - RPT; 
- TOP EVENT 2: argon run-
away evaporation.
The RPT explosion is due to the 
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contact between the liquid argon and 
the water, with the production of a great 
amount of gaseous argon and shock wave.
In this case, the lack of insulation 
of the cryostat could be due to an over-
pressure or to a crack in the vessel (i.e. 
human error in the welding phase, wet 
corrosion, etc.).
The use of a cryostat “intrinsically 
safe” allowed to reduce the estimated 
probability of occurrence of RPT to 10-8 
event/year (Guarascio et al., 2013). The 
GERDA cryostat, in fact, is realized with 
suitable materials (leak before break), with 
double wall and double containment.
The argon runaway evaporation 
beyond functional values leads to asphyxi-
ation and hypothermia risks.
The estimated thermal power of the 
Argon is 5 kW/m2 with initial evaporation 
rate of 104 m3/h. A double polycarbonate 
layer, the LEXAN, is inserted in the inner 
and outer walls of the cryostat, in order 
to reduce the thermal transmission coef-
ficient and to achieve a greater insulation 
of the cryostat.
The hazard analysis conducted 
before the approval and the installation 
of the GERDA experiment shows the fol-
lowing results:
TOP EVENT PROBABILITY OF OCCURENCE [event/year]
TOP EVENT 1 - Rapid Phase Transition P(E1) = 10
-8 -10-9
TOP EVENT 2 - Argon runaway evaporation P(E2) = 10
-4 Table 1
Hazard analysis results.
According to Italian Legislative De-
cree 334/99, all the events with a probabil-
ity of occurrence greater than 10-6 event/
year have been considered (Guarascio et 
al., 2013).
Among the different events iden-
tified in the Risk Assessment, the Top 
Event 2 has certainly the higher prob-
ability of occurrence. In fact, during 
the whole design process and analysis, 
several structural measures have been 
put into practice:
- the original single copper wall 
cryostat has been replaced by a double 
wall stainless steel one;
- there is a mutual independence 
between the two stainless steel walls, 
guaranteeing a "double containment wall 
all over";
- the vacuum gap between the walls 
is under monitoring;
- the cryostat has been "coated" 
with a lexan layer both on the inner and 
on the outer side, and with a mylar layer 
on the outer side, completely "wrapping" 
the whole cryostat;
- a thermo-mechanical analysis 
shows that the leak from a wall as con-
sequence of a single break on the other 
one is drastically reduced.
For the above cited reasons, the RPT 
Event resulted as being extremely unlikely 
(< 10-8ev/y) and attention has been fo-
cused on the TOP EVENT 2 (Marcoulaki 
et al., 2016) deepening the analysis and 
proposing technical improvements.
3.2 HAZOP Analysis of the extraction and ventilation plant
Hazards related to the extraction 
and ventilation plant have been identified: 
this plant has been divided into nodes; 
for each node process parameters and 
guide words have been applied (Groth et 
al., 2012).
The primary objective of the plant 
is to ensure, in an emergency situation, 
the gaseous argon extraction up to a flow 
rate of 104 m3/h. 
Considering the scope of the plant, 
the HazOp Analysis (Stefana et al., 2015) 
highlighted that a lack of flow in the piping 
could be due to the fan seizing or to an 
incomplete opening of the shut-off damp-
ers, caused by human error or component 
breakdown. According to the human 
reliability analysis, the critical events and 
the corresponding causes leading to the 
unsuccessful operation of the plant are 
reported in Table 2.
Event Causes
Incomplete opening of the shut-off dampers
Malfunctioning of the control device
Lack of power
Fireproof  damper  closing High Temperature in the piping system
Lack of power to the 
electric motor of the extractor
Shut-down of the electric system
Malfunction of the power supply system
Non-ordinary maintenance Table 2
Synthesis of the HazOp Analysis.
3.3 Fault Tree Analysis-FTA
In this section is conducted the Fault 
Tree Analysis (Guarascio et al., 2007) of 
the Top Event identified by the previous 
HazOp: gaseous Argon release in Hall A.
For the event occurrence (Brighton 
et al., 1994), both the incomplete opening 
of the air dampers and the failure of the 
extraction system have to occur, and for 
this reason the FTA has two branches, 
connected by the logic gate “AND”: fail-
ure of the extraction and ventilation plant 
and incomplete opening of the dampers.
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Figure 2
The GERDA extraction plant layout.
The system is equipped with leak 
of liquid, temperature variation and 
oxygen deficiency detectors (Crowl et 
Louvar, 1990), connected to the cor-
responding optical and /or acoustic 
alarms (see Figure 2). In case of failure 
of the mechanized extraction system, 
the operator activates the P2 command 
and then the P3 one.
Top Event Actual Event Non-considered Event State of the system
Gaseous Argon 
release in Hall A
Failure of the 
extraction and 
ventilation plant
Concurrence of 
critical events
Incomplete opening 
of the Air Dampers 
Button breakage
Failure of the 
extraction system
Sabotage  
Table 3
Characteristics of the system 
and Conditions for the FTA development.
The output of Fault tree analysis 
is summarized below according to 
Figure 3. The failure modes aim to 
evaluate the probability of occurrence 
according to the top events (Khan et 
al., 2001).
Figure 3
Results of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
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First branch: incomplete opening of the dampers
The main causes of the incomplete 
opening of the dampers represented by the 
logic gate “OR” are:
- Damage of mechanical device.
- Failure of the damper activation 
system.
The damage of mechanical device is 
a “basic event”, representing a final cause 
without sub-events.
The failure of the damper ac-
tivation system could be due to two 
main causes, represented by the logic 
gate “OR”:
- Facilities failure.
- No signal for the damper opening.
The facilities failure is a “basic 
event” representing a final cause without 
sub-events.
The absence of signal for the damper 
opening could be due to two main causes, 
represented by the logic gate “OR”:
- Sensor warning failure.
- Failure on the activation of the 
opening command.
The sensor warning failure could be 
due to three main causes, represented by 
the logic gate “OR”:
- PLC-Programmable Logic Con-
trol Damage
- Sensor Damage 
- Wiring Damage.
These three events are “basic 
events” representing a final cause with-
out sub-events.
The failure on the activation of the 
opening command could be due to two 
main causes, represented by the logic 
gate “OR”:
- Alarm system Damage.
- Human Error: wrong reaction to 
the alarm warning.
Both the events are “basic 
events” and the human error has been 
analyzed by the Human Reliability 
Analysis – HRA.
Second branch: failure of the extraction system
The main causes of the failure of 
the extraction system, represented by 
the logic gate “OR”, are:
- Ventilation system failure.
- Absence of electric power supply.
The failure of the ventilation sys-
tem could be due to two main causes, 
represented by the logic gate “OR”:
- Fan jam.
- Electric Motor Failure.
Both these events are “basic 
event” representing a final cause with-
out sub-events.
The absence of electric power sup-
ply could be due to two main causes, 
represented by the logic gate “OR”:
- Error on the start command 
activation
- Lack of energy power.
The error on the start command 
activation could be due to two main 
causes, represented by the logic gate 
“OR”:
- Human Error.
- Alarm system Damage.
Both the events are “basic events” 
and the human error has been analyzed 
in the Human Reliability Analysis - HRA.
The lack of energy power could be 
due to two main causes, represented by 
the logic gate “OR”:
- Wiring Damage.
- Energy shut-down.
Both the events are “basic events” 
for the TOP EVENT and complete the 
structure of the FTA.
Basic Events: Fan jam, Wiring 
Damage, Energy shut-down, Electric 
Motor Failure, Human Error and Alarm 
system Damage have a greater influence 
on the probability of occurrence of the 
top event, therefore:
- a little improvement of the 
electric line reliability involves a great 
improvement of the entire system reli-
ability;
- once the top event occurs, the 
lack of energy power has a probability 
of occurrence equal to 1.
The FTA results suggest the use of 
UPS, the improvement of the opening 
damper system maintenance and the 
optimization of the intervention and 
training procedures.
3.4 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
The Event Tree proceeds with an-
other two branch points, in order to verify 
the effectiveness of the control and regula-
tion valve systems, and of the extraction 
system activated both automatically and 
by the operator.
Once the argon is released from 
the cryostat, the main cause of the ar-
gon emission in Hall A is the failure of 
the extraction system.
Safety measures related to the 
dampers opening consist of the au-
tomatic activation of the control and 
regulation valves and of the system for 
the extraction of cryogenic gases.
Furthermore, the operator can 
directly adopt these safety measures, 
in redundancy with the system.
The experiment is equipped with 
liquid leak detectors, temperature and 
oxygen sensors.
In the ETA construction (Guaras-
cio et al., 2013), two branch points have 
been considered in order to define the 
effectiveness of the first safety measure: 
the reliability of the safety measure 
itself is guaranteed by the correct op-
eration, both of the detector and the 
alarm systems. In the branch related 
to the correct operation of the alarm 
system, another branch point concern-
ing the correct reaction of the operator 
is present.
Branch point related to the correct operation of the detector system
The Event Tree proceeds with a 
branch point in order to verify the suc-
cess or not of the systems power-up. In 
this case, the reaction of the operator it 
is not considered.
The ETA leads to the implementa-
tion of safety measures to prevent the 
main event (Gaseous Argon release):
- alerts for the operator by means of 
optical and acoustic alarms in the control 
room, done by sensors;
- full opening of the dampers in 
the main general exhaust duct, done by 
the operator;
- starting the extraction electric 
motor at operating speed in order to 
conduct the vaporized argon, done by 
the operator.
Branch point related to the correct operation of the alarm system
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3.5 Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
HRA (Lombardi et al., 2014) has 
been carried out in order to deepen the 
evaluation of the actions performed by 
the operator in the control room. The task 
analysis performed ensures the following 
steps: recognition and identification of the 
alarm warning, call to the suitable opera-
tive action, identification of the extraction 
system activation button.
The HRA (Sun et al., 2012) has 
identified the main operational condi-
tions influencing the operator work and 
predisposing him to mistakes, as the fol-
lowing ones:
- excess of noise outside the operat-
ing room could impede the hearing of the 
alarm system;
- wrong location of the optical alarm 
warning could impede its own identification;
- absence of a feedback device for 
the information of the operator about the 
activation of the extraction system;
- incongruity between procedures 
and operational activities;
- incomplete layout of the instru-
mentation;
- monotony of the surveillance.
The event tree related to the Human 
Reliability (Ying at al., 2010) regarding 
the reaction in case of alarm warning is 
(see Figure 4):
- Small letters represent success of 
the operation;
- Capital letters represent the human 
behavior;
- Greek letters represent the opera-
tion of the protection systems.
Considering the failure prob-
abilities and the operator’s mistakes 
probabilities (Holmes et al., 1998), the 
overall human failure (Gtotal) is equal to 
0.092 (see table 4).
Figure 4
Human Reliability Analysis. 
Reaction in case of alarm warning
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Damage Sequence of events
G1= ∆ 5.242E-03
G2= δ A 5.969E-03
G3 = δ aB 2.966E-03
G4 = δ abC 2.957E-02
G5 = δ abcDr1 9.562E-05
G6 = δ abc(d+Dr1)Σ 4.781E-02
Gtotal 9.200E-02
Table 4
Damage list and 
sequence of event corresponding.
4. Conclusion
The risk analysis procedure 
(Stamatelatos and Dezfuli, 2011) has been 
performed on the plants of the GERDA 
Experiment, located in the Hall A of 
the Underground Gran Sasso National 
Laboratory. According to different and 
complementary methodologies, the Risk 
Assessment has ensured a better analysis of 
the system and related hazards, by analyz-
ing also the effect of human behavior into 
possible failure modes. 
In particular, the event “Argon run-
away evaporation” has been analyzed: its 
probability of occurrence is equal to 10-4 
event/year and the Top Event “Gaseous 
Argon Release in Hall A ” is the most 
critical one. 
Based on the analysis (Pasman et 
al., 2009), three main corrective actions 
have been adopted in order to increase 
the reliability of the system. The actions 
comprehend both technical and manage-
rial measures reported as follows:
1. Structural Intervention - addition 
of UPS (Unit Power Supply) in the extrac-
tor electricity supply system: this measure 
guarantees relevant reduction of the prob-
ability of occurrence of the Top Event 
[value of probability between 6.26x10-2 
and 1.23x10-2 event/year].
2. Preventive maintenance approach 
for the control, regulation and activation 
device of the opening of the dampers: it 
is an electromechanical device subject to 
failure in its lifetime; periodic inspections 
and maintenance can lead to a reduction 
of the Top Events probability.
3. Periodical information and train-
ing of the operating staff in charge of con-
trols: the continuous training is crucial in 
order to reduce the probability of mistakes 
and to ensure an higher level of attention 
in the operations of the staff itself.
According to the evidences of avail-
able statistical reports, the effect of non 
compliant human behavior is the most 
relevant element about the causal analysis 
of the system failure (Duijm et al., 2006). 
Based on the result of this back 
analysis a lot of control procedures are 
necessary in order to decrease failure oc-
currences (Sun et al., 2011).
The following step of this research 
will be the evaluation of the human error 
according to the integrated techniques of 
fault tree analysis and Ishikawa’s model 
tested on the procedures usually employed.
References
BRIGHTON, P. W. M., BYRNE, A. J., CLEAVER, A. P., COURTIADE, P., 
CRABOL, B., FITZPATRICK, R. D. et al. Comparison of heavy gas dis-
persion models for instantaneous releases. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 
v. 36, p. 193–208, 1994.
CROWL, D.A., LOUVAR, J.F. Chemical process safety: fundamentals with applica-
tions. (3rd. Ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990.
DUIJM, N. J., CARISSIMO, B., MERCER, A., BARTHOLOME, C., GIESBRE-
CHT, H. Development & test of evaluation protocol for heavy gas dispersion mo-
dels. Journal of Hazardous Materials, v. 56, p. 273–285, 1997.
DUIJM, N. J., GOOSSENS, L. Quantifying the influence of safety management 
on the reliability of safety barriers. Journal of Hazardous Materials, v. 130, 
p. 284–292, 2006.
GROTH, K.M., SHEN, S.-H., OXSTRAND, J., MOSLEH, A., KELLY, D. A mo-
del-based approach to HRA: example application and quantitative analysis. In: 
INTERNATIONAL PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND MANA-
GEMENT CONFERENCE, 11; ANNUAL EUROPEAN SAFETY AND RE-
LIABILITY CONFERENCE. PSAM11 ESREL, p. 1009-1018, 2012.
GUARASCIO, M., LOMBARDI, M., MASSI, F. Risk analysis in handling and 
storage of petroleum products. American Journal of Applied Sciences, v. 10, 
n. 9, p. 965-978, 2013.
GUARASCIO, M., LOMBARDI, M., ROSSI, G., SCIARRA, G., Risk analysis 
and acceptability criteria. WIT Transactions on the Built Environment, v. 94, 
REM, Int. Eng. J., Ouro Preto, 70(3), 307-315, jul. sep. | 2017 315
Mara Lombardi et al.
 Received: 10 October 2016 - Accepted: 30 March 2017.
p. 131-138, 2007.
HOLMES, N., GIFFORD, S.M., TRIGGS, T.J. Meanings of risk control in oc-
cupational health and safety among employers and employees. Safety Science, 
v. 28, n. 3, p. 14 I - 154, 1998.
KHAN, F. I., ABBASI, S. A. An assessment of the likelihood of occurrence, and 
the damage potential of domino effect (chain of accidents) in a typical cluster 
of industries. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, v. 14, n.4, 
p. 283–306, 2001.
LOMBARDI, M., GUARASCIO, M., ROSSI, G. The management of uncertainty: 
model for evaluation of human error probability in railway system. American Jour-
nal of Applied Sciences, v. 11, n. 3, p. 381-390, 2014.
MARCOULAKI, E.C., VENETSANOS, A.G., PAPAZOGLOU, I.A. Quantita-
tive safety assessment of pressure control failure in a deep underground large 
scale cryogenic installation. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, v. 151, 
p. 60-75, 2016.
PASMAN, H.J., JUNG, S., PREM, K., ROGERS, W.J., YANG, X. Is risk analysis a 
useful tool for improving process safety? Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, v. 22, n. 6, p. 769-777, 2009.
STAMATELATOS, M., DEZFULI, H. Probabilistic risk assessment. Procedure Gui-
de for NASA Managers and Practitioners. (2nd. Ed.). NASA/SP-2011-3421, 2011.
STEFANA, E., MARCIANO, F., et al., Predictive models to assess Oxygen Deficiency 
Hazard (ODH): a systematic review. Safety Science, v. 75, p. 1-14, 2015.
SUN, Z., LI, Z., GONG, E., XIE, H. Estimating human error probability using 
a modified CREAM. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, v. 100, 
p. 28-32, 2012.
SUN, R., CHEN, Y., LIU, X., PENG, T., LIU, L. A method of analysis integrating 
HCR and ETA modeling for determining risk associated with inadequate flight 
separation events. Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering, v. 1, issue 1, 
p. 19-27, 2011.
TIXIER, J., DUSSERRE, G., SALVI, O., GASTON, D. Review of 62 risk analysis 
methodologies of industrial plants. Journal of Loss Prevention in the process in-
dustries, v. 15, n.4, p. 291-303, 2002.
YING-JIE, J., ZHI-QIANG, S., HONG-WEI, X., ER-LING, G. A human error pro-
bability quantification method based on CREAM+Bayes. In: INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ADVANCED COMPUTER THEORY AND ENGINEE-
RING, 3. Proceedings... Chengdu: IEEE Xplore Press,  August 20-22, 2010.
ZHAO, JIN-LONG et al. The quantitative risk assessment of the storage tank areas 
based on the domino effect. In: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CIVIL 
ENGINEERING AND URBAN PLANNING, 4. Proceedings... Beijing, China: 
CRC Press, 2016. (Civil Engineering and Urban Planning IV).
